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A SUMMARY OF THE NFL'S INVESTIGATION INTO
THE NEW ORLEANS SAINTS ALLEGED BOUNTY
PROGRAM AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS
Christopher R. Deubert*
The last few presentations lead well into what I am going to talk
about, as certainly a many people think that there is a link between
the concussion litigation and what transpired in the New Orleans
Saints "pay-for-performance"/"bounty" program matter. Our firm,
Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC represented Jonathan Vilma, Saints line-
backer, in all matters related to the alleged Bounty Program. This
presentation turned article will detail the multi-step process of the rel-
evant proceedings.
The Saints were alleged to have run a Bounty Program for the 2009,
2010, 2011 seasons led by defensive coordinator Gregg Williams
whereby players allegedly put money into a pool to encourage the
injury of their opponents. The NFL alleged these actions violated the
NFL's purported "Bounty Rule."
On March 2, 2012, the National Football League ("NFL") released
its first press release about the allegations. At the same time, there
was also an internal security report that was released just to NFL
Clubs. This is the first time any of the players allegedly involved had
ever heard of this investigation. You could imagine Vilma was a little
surprised when he hears that there is an allegation that says he placed
a $10,000 bounty on Brett Favre during the 2010 NFC Championship
Game.
The NFL's March 2, 2012 press release claimed the NFL reviewed
over 18,000 documents totaling 50,000 pages to support its allegations.
Among other things, the NFL alleged that Saints players, coaches and
officials violated the NFL Constitution and Bylaws. The Bylaws alleg-
edly violated prohibit non-contract bonuses:
No member, nor any stockholder, director, officer, partner or em-
ployee thereof, or person holding an interest therein, nor any officer
or employee of the League shall. . . [o]ffer or pay a player or coach,
and no player or coach may receive any bonus, money, or thing of
* Associate, Peter R. Ginsberg Law, LLC, New York, NY; J.D./M.B.A., Fordham University
School of Law and Graduate School of Business, New York, NY; B.S., Sport Management, Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA.
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value for winning any game played in the League. No club or any
representative thereof, shall offer to pay, directly or indirectly, to a
player, and no player shall receive, any bonus of any kind unless
such bonus provision is attached to and/or incorporated in the con-
tract of such player[.]
Article 9.1(C)(8).
No bonus may be paid to a player or players for winning a particular
game; neither may remuneration or gifts of any kind other than
those listed in the contract of a player be announced, promised, or
paid directly or indirectly by a member club or by any person con-
nected with or employed by a club.
Article 9.3(F).
No blanket remuneration or bonuses shall be paid or given to play-
ers at any time.
Article 9.3(G).
NFL players are forbidden from being paid for anything that is not
contained within the four corners of their contracts. The NFL Consti-
tution and Bylaws is a separate legal document from the Collective
Bargaining Agreement negotiated between the NFL and the NFL
Players Association ("NFLPA"). Nevertheless, the NFL Constitution
and Bylaws are incorporated by reference into the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement. The players are thus bound by the terms of the NFL
Constitution and the Bylaws.
The purpose of the prohibition against non-contract bonuses is to
prevent salary cap circumvention. Beginning with when the NFL sal-
ary cap was implemented in 1993, any compensation paid to a player
has to count against the salary cap. Players and Clubs cannot circum-
vent or go around the salary cap by giving the player something is not
called for in the contract. The prohibition is encompassed within the
NFL's purported "Bounty Rule":
National Football League rules prohibit a club from offering or pay-
ing bonuses to a player for his or his team's performance against a
particular team, a particular opposing player or players, or a partic-
ular group of an opposing team, or for on-field misconduct, such as
personal fouls to or injuries inflicted on opposing players.
This restriction on clubs, which is called the "bounty rule," also pro-
hibits players and any other club employee from offering or ac-
cepting such a bonus. The "bounty rule" is designed not only to
preserve the League's competitive integrity, but also to promote
player safety by prohibiting a player or players from placing a
"bounty" on their opponents that could lead to unnecessarily vio-
lent acts.
Clubs, and players, are also prohibited from offering or paying bo-
nuses to players that are not included in the player's NFL Player
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Contract. Prohibited conduct by players includes, but is not limited
to, the establishment of bonus pools for special teams performance,
offering or sharing playoff game compensation with teammates,
payment of cash and non-cash awards to teammates for outstanding
performances or achievements, or agreements among players to re-
imburse or indemnify teammates in the event they are fined or sus-
pended without pay by the Commissioner.
However, gifts by players to teammates or other members of the
organization are permissible after the conclusion of a club's playing
season, provided that no offer, promise, or announcement of such a
gift was made during a club's playing season. If a player who has
been elected to the Pro Bowl desires to take a teammate or team-
mates to the game, it is permissible to make such arrangements af-
ter the announcement of Pro Bowl squads, provided that no offer,
promise, or announcement of such a gift was made prior to the se-
lection of the squads.
Prohibited conduct by players includes, but is not limited to, the
establishment of bonus pools for special teams performance, offer-
ing or sharing playoff game compensation with teammates, or pay-
ment of cash or noncash awards to teammates for outstanding
performances or achievements.
Violators may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action for con-
duct detrimental to the League or professional football.
NFL League Policies for Players.
The prohibition against non-contract bonuses also prohibits players
from receiving compensation for the injury of other players. The
Bounty Rule is contained in the NFL League Policies for Players,
which is not a collectively bargained document. Players have no say in
the League Policies for Players. From the NFLPA's perspective, the
NFL's League Policies for Players are not enforceable as a matter of
labor law. The players receive the Policies and in certain years Clubs
have required players to sign and acknowledge their receipt. In other
years, the Policies were simply given to the players.
On March 21, 2012, about three weeks after the initial press release,
The NFL disciplined the Saints coaches and officials: Williams, who by
this time was with the St. Louis Rams, was suspended indefinitely;
head coach Sean Payton was suspended for one year; General Man-
ager Mickey Loomis was suspended for eight games; and, assistant
head coach and linebackers coach Joe Vitt was suspended for six
games. The Saints were fined $500,000 and required to forfeit second
round draft picks in the 2012 and 2013 NFL Drafts.
THE LITIGATION MATTERS
In total there were six matters or six different litigations that took
place concerning the Saints' alleged Bounty Program.
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Matter number one was purportedly brought pursuant to Article 46
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, entitled Commissioner Dis-
cipline. Article 46 provides the process by which the Commissioner
can discipline players and the mechanism by which players can chal-
lenge the imposition of discipline by the Commissioner. Article 46 is
one of most controversial parts of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment because, in any other sport, any discipline opposed upon the
player by a commissioner is subject to neutral arbitration. That is not
the case in the NFL. This issue became much more important when
Commissioner Roger Goodell took over in 2006. Since taking over,
Commissioner Goodell has been renowned for his iron fist approach
to player conduct and discipline.
We move now to May 2, 2012, the first time that any players are
suspended: Vilma was suspended for one year; defensive tackle
Anthony Hargrove, at the time with the Green Bay Packers, was sus-
pended for eight games; defensive end Will Smith was suspended for
four games; and linebacker Scott Fujita, an NFLPA player representa-
tive with the Cleveland Browns, was suspended three games. Prior to
May 2, 2012, the NFL had stated that approximately 23 to 27 players
had been involved in the alleged Bounty Program. Consequently,
players had been wondering who was going to be disciplined. The
ground for suspending Vilma, Smith and Fujita is that they were cap-
tains of the defense during this time. Anthony Hargrove, on the other
hand, is alleged to have lied to NFL investigators when the NFL first
learned of the alleged Bounty Program in the winter of 2010.
Moving to matter number two, the day after discipline was first im-
posed, the first grievance is filed by the players under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. Article 43 controls the non-injury grievance
process. This grievance claimed that the release signed as part of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement prohibited the discipline imposed
by the NFL. The release reads in relevant part:
The NFL, on behalf of itself, the NFL, and the NFL Clubs and their
respective heirs, executors, administrators, representatives, agents,
successors and as-signs, releases and covenants not to sue, or to sup-
port financially or administratively, or voluntarily provide testimony
of any kind, including by declaration or affidavit in, any suit (includ-
ing any Special Master proceeding brought pursuant to the White
SSA and/or the Prior Agreement) against the NFLPA or any of its
members, or agents acting on its behalf, or any member of its bar-
gaining unit, with respect to conduct occurring prior to the execu-
tion of this Agreement.
Art. 4, § 3.
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The release was an especially important part of the 2011 Collective
Bargaining Agreement because the parties had just gone through ap-
proximately six months of litigation.' Importantly here, the release
prohibited the parties from suing with respect to conduct occurring
prior to the execution of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The grievance was brought by us and the NFLPA, representing Smith,
Hargrove and Fujita. We argued that Article 4, Section 3 prohibited
the majority of the NFL's intended discipline. We argued the NFL
could not punish the players for conduct that occurred prior to the
2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement. The bulk of the conduct was
alleged to have occurred in 2009, including the alleged bounty by
Vilma on Farve. This grievance was denied. Arbitrator Shyam Das
determined that the NFL's proposed discipline was not a "suit" as
contemplated by Article 4, Section 3.
Also on May 3, the second grievance, and third matter, was filed.
We commenced a System Arbitrator with System Arbitrator Stephen
Burbank. To understand the role of Special Master requires a de-
tailed understanding of NFL labor relations. Going back to the 1980s,
from 1987 to 1993 there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement.
There were multiple antitrust laws, mostly commenced in the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota. 2 Eventually, Reg-
gie White led a lawsuit in 1992 that could have potentially resulted in
billions of dollars in damages for antitrust violations. 3 That lawsuit
was settled and the settlement of the lawsuit became what essentially
is the modern Collective Bargaining Agreement. That settlement and
the resulting Collective Bargaining Agreement established the salary
cap, free agency, and several other provisions common to fans today.
As part of the settlement of the lawsuit, Minnesota District Court
Judge David Doty retained jurisdiction over the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, because it was the stipulation and settlement agreement
of the White lawsuit that became the basis of the Collective Bargain-
ing Agreement. That Collective Bargaining Agreement was extended
1. For more information on the 2011 Collective Bargaining Agreement and related litigation,
see Chris Deubert, Glenn Wong and John Howe, "All Four Quarters: A Retrospective and
Analysis of the 2011 Collective Bargaining Process and Agreement in the National Football
League" 19 UCLA Entertainment Law Review 1 (2012).
2. See Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988); Powell v. Nat'l
Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989); Powell v. Nat'l Football League, 764 F. Supp.
1351, 1358-59 (D. Minn. 1991); McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F.Supp. 871, 876 (D. Minn.
1992); Jackson v. Nat'l Football League, 802 F. Supp. 226, 228 (D. Minn. 1992).
3. White v. Nat'l Football League, 822 F. Supp. 1389, 1395 (D. Minn. 1993). The NFL also
paid $200 million to the players for the settlement of that lawsuit. See Will McDonough, Tenta-
tive Deal Reached in NFL Free Agency Among Concessions Made by Owners to NFL Players,
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 1992, at 59.
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three times (1998, 2001 and 2006) and Judge Doty always had to ap-
prove the new Collective Bargaining Agreement. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 53 permits Courts to appoint Masters to help
deal with complicated litigation. To help resolve anticipated disputes
under the new Collective Bargaining Agreement, a Special Master
was appointed as part of the White settlement.4
In 2002, University of Pennsylvania law professor Stephen Bur-
bank-an admitted non-football fan-was chosen as the third Special
Master. Each year there were approximately ten or a dozen Special
Master grievances that could ultimately be appealed to Judge Doty.5
However, the 2011 CBA ended Judge Doty's jurisdiction over the Col-
lective Bargaining Agreement. The parties agreed however to keep
Professor Burbank in a very similar role and designated him the Sys-
tem Arbitrator. System Arbitrator Burbank retained jurisdiction over
what are considered system issues, i.e., the type of issues that could be
subject to antitrust litigation, such as the Draft, free agency, salary cap
and the franchise tag. The salary cap being one of those issues, possi-
ble circumvention of the salary cap is an issue that comes within the
System Arbitrator's jurisdiction.
We argued that what the players were really being punished for was
alleged circumvention of the salary cap, i.e., being paid something that
was not in their contract. Circumvention of the salary cap falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the System Arbitrator:
A Club (or a Club Affiliate) and a player (or a Player Affiliate or
player agent) may not, at any time, enter into undisclosed agree-
ments of any kind, express or implied, oral or written, or promises,
undertakings, representations, commitments, inducements, assur-
ances of intent, or understandings of any kind: (a) involving consid-
eration of any kind to be paid, furnished or made available or
guaranteed to the player, or Player Affiliate, by the Club or Club
Affiliate either prior to, during, or after the term of the Player Con-
tract; and/or (b) concerning the terms of any renegotiation and/or
extension of any Player Contract by a player subject to a Franchise
Player or Transition Player designation.
Art. 14, § 1.
Thus, if the NFL wanted to punish the players that they had to bring
a system arbitration and that the players' conduct was not subject to
4. Fordham Law professor John Feerick was the original Special Master. NFL Has Labor
Agreement, but Salary Cap Stirs Debate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 16, 1994, available at
1994 WLNR 1991229. Feerick was replaced by Jack Friedenthal in 1996. Dave Sell, Schuler's
Salary Cap Status Requires Further Review, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 1996, available at 1996
WLNR 6488812.
5. See, e.g., White v. Nat'1 Football League, 2007 WL 939560, at *1 (D.Minn. Mar. 26, 2007);
White v. NFL, 533. F.Supp.2d 929 (D.Minn. 2008).
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Commissioner discipline under Article 46. System Arbitrator Bur-
bank denied our grievance but that was not the end of this matter.
Matter number four began two weeks after the first grievance was
filed. On May 17, 2012, Vilma filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana alleging defama-
tion for the things Commissioner Goodell had said publicly. Vilma,
contrary to the Commissioner's statements, alleged that he never:
established, or assisted in establishing, a Bounty Program or any
similar program in violation of NFL rules.
"pledged," made or received payments of any kind encouraging or
resulting from an opposing player being carried off the field, i.e.,
"cart-offs."
"pledged," made or received payments of any kind encouraging or
resulting from an opposing player being unable to return to the
game, i.e., "knockouts."
"pledged," made or received payments of any kind encouraging or
resulting from an opposing player being injured.
"targeted" an opposing player in any manner that would violate
NFL rules.
engaged "in unsafe and prohibited conduct intended to injure
players."
"participate[d] in a program that potentially injured opposing
players."
"embraced" a Bounty Program or any similar program in violation
of NFL rules.
- paid, or intended to pay, $10,000, or any amount of money, as an
incentive to any player to knock Warner, Favre, or any other player,
out of the 2009 Divisional Playoff Game, 2010 NFC Championship
Game, or any other game.
- placed $10,000, or any amount of money, on any table or anywhere
else as part of a Bounty Program or any other program in violation
of NFL rules.
On July 5, 2012, Commissioner Goodell moved to dismiss the defa-
mation lawsuit claiming that Vilma's claims were preempted by the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). 6 The LMRA is the
federal law that governs the relationship between employers and em-
ployees. The LMRA provides the basis for collective bargaining
agreements and strongly supports the proposition that the grievance
process under collective bargaining agreements is to be the exclusive
remedy by which an employee can challenge an employer's action.
Consequently, state law claims are generally preempted or barred by
the LMRA and a collective bargaining agreement. Claims like breach
of contract and medical malpractice are often preempted.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 185.
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Whether a state law claim is preempted turns on whether the claim
is "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agree-
ment.7 The question in Vilma's case was essentially whether the
Court needed to interpret the Collective Bargaining Agreement to de-
termine whether Commissioner Goodell was permitted to make the
statements he made.
We now go back to matter number one, the Article 46 Commis-
sioner Discipline proceeding. On June 18, 2012, the first appeal hear-
ing had occurred at the NFL offices. Commissioner Goodell served as
the arbitrator, even though he is not an attorney. Consequently, NFL
General Counsel Jeffrey Pash served as Commissioner Goodell's advi-
sor during the hearing, which consisted of a room full of twenty or so
attorneys and the four players.
The players did not participate on the merits during the first appeal
hearing, i.e., the players did not attempt to argue the merits of the
case. The players made procedural objections based on the failure to
produce documents, witnesses and Commissioner Goodell's bias.
Representing the NFL in this proceeding was Mary Jo White, recently
nominated by President Obama to be the Chairperson of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission. At the time, she was a Partner with
Debevoise Plimpton, LLP, a very prominent law firm in New York
City. She was formerly the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York. Clearly the NFL was taking the matter seri-
ously. Nevertheless, due to the procedural infirmities, the players re-
fused to participate that day. The hearing adjourned and
Commissioner Goodell took the matter under advisement.
We turn now to matter number five. On June 30, 2012, Vilma com-
menced a second lawsuit in the Eastern District of Louisiana, request-
ing Goodell to issue his decision because at that point everyone knew
what was going to happen. The players were planning to file an action
to vacate Commissioner Goodell's arbitration decision. Finally, on
July 3, Commissioner Goodell issues his arbitration decision, affirming
all of his previously imposed discipline. On July 5, Vilma amended his
complaint to include claims seeking to vacate the arbitration decision
under the LMRA and the Federal Arbitration Act.8 Vilma alleged
that the arbitration decision should be vacated for the following rea-
sons: a fundamentally unfair hearing; an arbitrary and capricious
award; the award failed to draw its essence from the Collective Bar-
7. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
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gaining Agreement; arbitrator misconduct; the arbitrator exceeded his
authority; and arbitrator partiality.
Moving to matter number six, also on July 5, 2012, the NFLPA filed
suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of the three players
and themselves. The NFLPA action is substantially similar to Vilma's
action and sought to vacate Commissioner Goodell's arbitration deci-
sion. On July 20, the NFL moved to dismiss both cases, citing courts'
deference to arbitration decisions.
Going back for a moment, Commissioner Goodell's suspension of
Vilma took effect immediately, meaning Vilma was barred from train-
ing camp which got underway in July. In an attempt to avoid missing
training camp, Vilma brought a motion for temporary training order
and for a preliminary injunction to try and get himself back on the
field as soon as possible. During the hearing, the Honorable Helen G.
Berrigan indicated her preference to rule in Vilma's favor:
THE COURT: Well, I'll be candid with you. I would like to rule in
Mr. Vilma's favor. I think the proceedings were neither transparent
nor fair. I think I made that clear the other day. I think the refusal
to identify the accusers, much less have them at the hearing to be
cross-examined, to look at biases, flaws in their testimony, and
18,000 documents that apparently were relied upon by Mr. Goodell,
less than 200 were actually provided to you, many of them were
redacted. I do think you did exhaust your remedies at that hearing,
because in essence, I think you were thwarted at every time by Mr.
Goodell's refusal to provide you meaningful access to witnesses and
to documents...
MR. GINSBERG: Sure. Let me say that I too hope that you can
rule for Mr. Vilma.
THE COURT: If I can do it legally, I will. If I find a way, I will.
The Court took Vilma's motion under advisement.
Now going back to matter number three, the system arbitration
before professor Burbank. The players lost in front of System Arbi-
trator Burbank. Under the old Collective Bargaining Agreement, as I
mentioned the parties could appeal then-Special Master Burbank's
decisions to Judge Doty. Although Judge Doty was divested of juris-
diction, the parties did retain an appeal process. The parties agreed
that there would be an Appeals Panel but, at the time of the Bounty
proceedings, the Appeals Panel had not yet been constituted.
The Appeals Panel was eventually constituted and considered the
players' appeal of System Arbitrator Burbank's decision during a
hearing on August 30, 2012. On September 7, 2012, two days before
the season began, the Appeals Panel reversed System Arbitrator Bur-
bank's decision, vacated the discipline and remanded the matter to
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Commissioner Goodell. The Appeals Panel found that System Arbi-
trator Burbank would have exclusive jurisdiction to determine penal-
ties for agreements to receive payments from a pool. The Appeals
Panel found that Goodell's basis for the discipline was unclear and
had to be reconsidered on remand.
On remand, the players agreed to meet with Commissioner Good-
ell. Those meetings took place on September 17 and 18, 2012. During
those meetings, for the first time and more than six months after the
allegations were first made public, Commissioner Goodell identified
the accusers. The players' suspicions were confirmed that the accusers
were Gregg Williams and Mike Cerullo, Williams' former assistant
who was fired after his one season with the Saints in 2009. Ultimately,
there were many, many reasons to question Cerullo's credibility, only
some of which was been made public.
After the meetings, Commissioner Goodell reimposed discipline.
The discipline was substantially the same: Vilma was suspended for
the remainder of the season, having been unable to play due to injury;
Hargrove, who at that point was unemployed, received credit for the
games he has missed; and Smith's suspension stayed the same. The
biggest change occurred with Fujita's discipline. Fujita had told Com-
missioner Goodell that he did not participate in the pool. Commis-
sioner Goodell believed Fujita and vacated his prior grounds for
disciplining Fujita. Commissioner Goodell instead came up with an
entirely new ground, an entirely new alleged violation of the Constitu-
tion and Bylaws resulting in a one game suspension for Fujita.
On October 11, 2012, the players appealed the Commissioner's
newest round of discipline. The suspensions did not take affect while
the appeals were pending. At the same time as the appeal, the players
requested Commissioner Goodell to recuse himself from the process
in light of his having spent months publicly defending his actions and
the discipline.
Following the Appeals Panel's vacatur of Commissioner Goodell's
discipline, Judge Berrigan indicated she would let the process play out
before making any decisions. Nevertheless, the Court requested that
we conditionally file motions to vacate the anticipated result of the
appeals process. Judge Berrigan wanted to be able to render a deci-
sion as soon as Commissioner Goodell issued his arbitration decision
on the appeal. The players took this as a good sign that the Court was
prepared to vacate any discipline imposed.
On October 19, 2012, the day after the conditional motions to va-
cate were fully briefed, Commissioner Goodell recused himself from
the process and appointed former Commissioner Paul Tagliabue as
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the arbitrator for the second appeal hearing. After leaving the NFL in
2006, Commissioner Tagliabue rejoined the law firm of Covington &
Burling LLP. Commissioner Tagliabue began his legal career at Cov-
ington & Burling, which has been the NFL's chief outside chief coun-
sel for the last 50 years. Commissioner Tagliabue personally
represented the NFL in dozens of cases before becoming Commis-
sioner. Additionally, Covington & Burling was representing Commis-
sioner Goodell and the NFL in the proceedings in the Eastern District
of Louisiana.
In light of these issues, the players filed a motion to recuse Commis-
sioner Tagliabue with Commissioner Tagliabue and also submitted
supplemental briefing on the issue to the Court. On November 5,
2012, Commissioner Tagliabue denied the motion to recuse. The sec-
ond appeal process then commenced with various pre-hearing confer-
ences and additional discovery. There was an immediate difference in
the way Commissioner Tagliabue handled the proceedings as com-
pared to Commissioner Goodell.
Hearings were held in Washington, D.C. on November 27, 29 and
30 and in New Orleans on December 3. On December 11, 2012, Com-
missioner Tagliabue issued his decision, vacating all discipline against
the players but purported to "affirm" Commissioner Goodell's find-
ings, except as to Fujita. Commissioner Tagliabue determined that
Vilma, Smith and Hargrove had engaged in conduct detrimental to
the game of football but that discipline was not appropriate. Commis-
sioner Tagliabue placed the blame for any wrongdoing on the Saints'
coaches and organization and faulted Commissioner Goodell's efforts
to rapidly change a long-standing practice in the NFL. Commissioner
Tagliabue did, however, find that Fujita did not engage in conduct
detrimental.
On December 12, 2012, the day after Commissioner Tagliabue's de-
cision, the players indicated to the Court that they accepted Commis-
sioner Tagliabue' decision and the players' actions to vacate (matters
five and six) were dismissed. Vilma's defamation case was still
pending.
On January 17, 2013, the Court dismissed the defamation case on
preemption grounds.9 The Court determined that Goodell's com-
ments were made as part of his duties under the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and thus any complaints needed to be addressed by the
processes provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. De-
9. Vilma v. Goodell, 12-cv-1283, 2013 WL 192436 (E.D.La Jan. 17, 2013).
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spite the Court's decision, the Court did take the opportunity to chide
Commissioner Goodell and the NFL for its handling of the matter:
While the Court is extremely disturbed by the fundamental lack of
due process in Goodell's denying the players the identities of and
the right to confront their accusers, that was substantially rectified
later in the process. So while the process was initially procedurally
flawed, the statements were ultimately found to have enough sup-
port to defeat the defamation claims...
Even though this matter has been pending only since May of this
year, it feels as protracted and painful as the Saints season itself,
and calls for closure. The Court nonetheless believes that had this
matter been handled in a less heavy handed way, with greater fair-
ness toward the players and the pressures they face, this litigation
and the related cases would not have been necessary.
After a nearly ten month process, the players ultimately were not sus-
pended which can only be viewed as a win for the players and an in-
dictment of Commissioner Goodell's handling of the matter.
